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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Hughes appeals from

Otis James

the

judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict ﬁnding him

guilty of conspiracy to trafﬁc in heroin, trafﬁcking in heroin (three counts), possession of

methamphetamine with

On

paraphernalia.

of marijuana, and possession of drug

intent to deliver, possession

appeal,

Hughes argues

the district court erred

by denying retained counsel’s

pre-trial

motion

effective

and conﬂict-free counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment

0f that motion violated his “right t0

t0 Withdraw, claiming that the denial

to the

United States

Constitution.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)

Statement
In

Of The

May

Boise Hotel.

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

2017, ofﬁcers received information that Hughes was selling heroin out of the

— p.192,

(TL, p.190, L.16

L.18, p.233, Ls.4-12.)

In three separate transactions

during that same month, Benjamin Jephson sold heroin to an undercover ofﬁcer in the parking lot

of the Boise Hotel. (TL, p.173, L.20 — p.174, L.13, p.182, L.9 — p.188, L.24, p.264, L.3 — p.268,
L.25, p.301, L.2

— p.309,

L.23, p.370, L.18

—

L.24, p.313, Ls.12-19, p.314, L.8

p.372, L.4.)

from the ofﬁcer and then went
supplier.

(TL, p.187, L.25

p.375, L.22

— p.380,

Boise Hotel.
his pocket,

L.13

—

—

to

During the

Room

last

two

—

p.324, L.13, p.347, L.21

transactions,

616 0f the Boise Hotel

p.188, L.19, p.318, L.2

—

one 0f which unlocked the door

p.234, L.16, p.393, L.21

— p.395,

t0

— p.392,

to retrieve the heroin

p.321, L.11, p.350, L.8

Room

L.4.)

616.

L.24, p.397, L.24

(TL, p.194, L.19

—

from

his

p.353, L.16,

Hughes outside the

Hughes had two

— p.398,

p.358,

Jephson collected payment

L.23.) Shortly after the last transaction, ofﬁcers arrested

(TL, p.194, Ls.1-18, p.386, L.4

—

hotel

key cards

— p.195,

in

L.7, p.233,

L.18, p.401, Ls.20—23.)

And

hotel documents

conﬁrmed

L.18.) Ofﬁcers searched

that

Room

Hughes was “the
616 pursuant

renter 0f [that] room.” (TL, p.196, L.7

to a warrant

methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia,

scales,

— p.198,

and found, among other things, heroin,
and packaging materials. (TL, p.246,

L.25 — p.247, L.7, p.477, L.9 — p.481, L.21, p.496, L.8 — p.498, L.21, p.501, L.23 — p.506, L.5;

ﬂ

generally State’s Exhibits 20A-20T,

22A-22D, 23A-23L.) Jephson

— p.370,

his heroin supplier. (T12, p.361, Ls.18-24, p.367, L.25

A

later

identiﬁed Hughes as

L.5.)

grand jury indicted Hughes for conspiracy to trafﬁc in heroin, three counts 0f

trafﬁcking in heroin, one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, one

count of possession of marijuana With intent t0 deliver, and one count 0f possession of drug
(R., pp.27-30.)

paraphernalia.

enhancement

The

for having previously

Hughes retained

private counsel,

Hughes was subject

to a sentencing

been convicted 0f a trafﬁcking offense.

(R., pp.64-65.)

state also alleged

George Patterson,

Hughes’ and Jephson’s cases were consolidated for

On November

6,

Hughes was “proactive

2017, Hughes sent a
in [his] case”

brought to [the court’s] attention.”

and

to represent him.

trial.

(R., p.96.)

Thereafter,

(R., pp.31-36, 44.)

letter to the district court,

that there

(R., p.44.)

advising the court that

were “some issues”

Among

other things,

that “need[ed] to

Hughes

innocence, represented that he had asked Mr. Patterson to ﬁle motions for

be

asserted his

him and

that

Mr.

Patterson “said he would,” requested that he personally be allowed t0 100k at the search warrant

to

“make

like to

sure that

it is

authentic and not forged,” and “provided a

have ﬁled,” including a motion

and a “[m]otion

t0 stand in court

to suppress, a

and speak

indicate any intention to ﬁre Mr. Patterson

counsel.

(E R., pp.96-97.)

motion

to the judge.”

list

0f motions that [he] would

t0 dismiss, a

motion for discovery,

(R., pp.96-97.)

Hughes did not

and did not otherwise request a substitution 0f

On November
jury

trial.

13,

(R., pp.92-93.)

2017, Hughes, through Mr. Patterson, ﬁled a motion to continue the

At a hearing on

the motion, Mr. Patterson advised the court that there

were questions about the authenticity of the search warrant
motion

t0 suppress.

(TL, p.1

1,

L.11

—

that

Mr. Patterson wanted

t0 raise in a

After hearing from the prosecutor and

p.12, L.6.)

Jephson’s attorney, and noting a motion to suppress had not yet been ﬁled, the court denied the

motion for a continuance but indicated

it

would review a motion

to suppress if

ﬁled one. (TL, p.13, L.1 — p.16, L.2.) At the end 0f the hearing, Jephson asked

something real quick” and then

said, “I did

Which point Jephson’s attorney cut him

not ever say this

off.

man had

Mr. Patterson

if he

could “say

anything to d0 with

it --,”

at

The court advised Jephson

(Tr., p.21, Ls.1 1-18.)

did not “want to hear about the culpability 0f anybody” and that the court’s “job [was] to

it

make

sure that everybody gets forward t0 a fair trial.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-24.)

At a

pretrial

conference 0n

November

20, 2017, Mr. Patterson advised the court that his

concerns about the search warrant had been addressed and that Hughes was ready t0 proceed t0

trial

on December

5th.

(1

1/20/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-23.) At the end of the pretrial conference,

personally addressed the court. (1 1/20/17 Tr., p.9, L.14

—

p.1

1,

He

L.2.)

Hughes

expressed concern that

evidence 0f his innocence, Which he claimed had “been confessed plenty of times,” had not been
presented, and he relayed his belief that a “motion for dismissal” should have been ﬁled.

(1

1/20/17 Tr., p.9, L.17

— p.10,

don’t even have to stand up,

when--”

(1

L.7.)

sir,

He

also asked:

and bother you With

1/20/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.8-1

1.)

this?

I

get things

How d0

I

send

In response, the court advised

t0 address things through [his] lawyer,” that

and

“[H]0W do

0n record

to

Where

letters in to the

Hughes

that

I

Court

he “need[ed]

“[s]ome things are just not admissible evidence,”

that if Hughes “ha[d] a motion, [he] could present

it

through

[his]

lawyer and he would make

the motion rather than trying to send [the court] a letter.” (1 1/20/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 12-23.)

On November
attorney.

21, 2017, Mr. Patterson ﬁled a motion for leave t0 Withdraw as Hughes’

made

In an afﬁdavit ﬁled in support 0f the motion, Mr. Patterson

(R., pp.103-08.)

following representations:

6.

I

have reviewed [Hughes’] discovery With him 0n three separate occasions.
for an hour-and-a-half 0n Sunday, November 19, 2017, the

The most recent being
day before his
7.

During

pre-trial conference.

that Visit

I

also discussed in detail With Mr.

Hughes

his request that

ﬁle a motion t0 suppress the search warrant in his case and provided

him with

opinion that such a motion was frivolous and the legal reasoning behind

8.

Despite our long meeting the day before and

insisted in attempting to address this issue in

my

open court

my

it.

explanation, Mr.
at his pre-trial

I

Hughes

conference

0n November 20, 2017.
Mr. Hughes previously attempted t0 communicate directly to the court in a
letter addressed t0 Judge Hippler, dated November 6, 2017.
9.

10. On November 20, 2017, I received a certiﬁed letter from Mr. Hughes which
was dated November 15, 2017, in Which he requests that I ﬁle a motion t0 dismiss
his case based on what he describes as an “altered and fake search warrant[.]” He
lists other grounds Which he believes support a dismissal of his case.

11.

12.

He

states in this

This

letter

same

letter that

was mailed

he

prior to

is

sending the

my

letter to the

Idaho State Bar.

meeting with him 0n November

19,

however, Mr. Hughes[‘] insistence 0n addressing these same ideas to the Court on

November

20,

makes

clear that he did not accept

my

legal advice With regard to

the issues he raised.

13.

His contact With the State Bar, While not ofﬁcially a bar compliant, puts

a potentially adversarial position With

14.

me

in

my client.

Mr. Hughes obviously does not have conﬁdence in
what is in his best legal interest.

my representation

and

we

are at an impasse as to

15.

In addition t0 the above, an ethical concern has arisen

liberty t0 disclose to the court, but

Hughes adequately

at trial.

Which makes

me

Which

I

am

not at

unable t0 represent Mr.

the

16.

For the reasons stated herein,

I

do not believe

it is

possible to render effective

assistance of counsel to Mr. Hughes.

(R., pp.105-O7.)

At a hearing on
seeking to Withdraw.

the motion, Mr. Patterson elaborated

(Tr., p.22,

L.7 — p.24, L.5.)

He

on the reasons he was

reiterated that

Hughes

“insisted that

[Mr. Patterson] bring a motion to dismiss based 0n [Hughes’] theory that the search

warrant was

dummied up by Judge

Steckel.”

Mr. Patterson

(TL, p.22, Ls.16-18.)

explained that he and the prosecutor actually met With Judge Steckel to discuss the

warrant and, as a result of that meeting, Mr. Patterson determined that a motion to
dismiss “would be frivolous” and Mr. Patterson was “not going to ﬁle

Mr. Patterson also reiterated that Hughes had sent a

Ls.18-25.)

complaining about Mr. Patterson’s performance.
Patterson represented that

Hughes had “some

legally,” including a belief that

stand and exonerate him.”

it.”

(Tr., p.22,

letter t0

(TL, p.23, Ls.1-13.)

the Bar

Finally,

Mr.

unrealistic assumptions that don’t bear out

“Mr. Jephson, the co-defendant, [was] going t0 get 0n the

(TL, p.23, L.13

—

p.24, L.1.)

Mr. Patterson concluded,

“I

think with his frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic View 0f how the case can

be resolved, Ican no longer give effective legal counsel.”

The

district court

(Tr., p.24, Ls.2-5.)

denied the motion t0 Withdraw. (TL, p.24, L.6 — p.26, L.9.) The

court reasoned that the decision whether t0 ﬁle motions

attorney based

upon the

attorney’s

was

“really a decision 0f the

View of the likelihood of success of

that

motion

in

consultation with his client” and that Hughes’ disagreement with Mr. Patterson’s decision

to not ﬁle a

Withdraw.

motion he deemed frivolous did not

(T12, p.24,

L.6

—

p.25, L.11.)

“state a basis” for

Mr. Patterson

The court advised Hughes: “Mr. Patterson

to

is

You’re

private counsel.

counsel.”

(TL, p.25, Ls.12-14.)

and ﬁre him as you see ﬁt and bring

Although the court “appreciate[d]

feel like he’s in a difﬁcult situation

might
court

free to hire

was conﬁdent

that

because a

that

in another

Mr. Patterson

bar was written,” the

letter t0 the

Mr. Patterson was “a very good lawyer and [could] ethically d0

his best job, notwithstanding that letter being ﬁled.” (TL, p.25, Ls.14-18.)

The court

also

explained that “[t]he problem With allowing someone t0 Withdraw every time someone
writes a letter complaining t0 the bar, particularly

on the eve of

abuse to allow — to basically put off trial.” (TL, p.25, Ls.19-25.)
“not just Mr. Hughes’

trial

date that[]

Jephson [was] also affected by
p.26, L.4.)

this,

And

that [made]

it

trial rights.”

you withdraw

it

was

(TL, p.25, L.25

Mr. Patterson,

would deny Mr. Patterson’s motion

requested and was given permission t0 speak.

—

“I can’t

t0 withdraw,

Hughes

Hughes

told the

(TL, p.26, Ls.11-12.)

court that he understood “it’s up t0 counsel,” but that he did not think

Mr. Patterson,

dismiss.

it

this close t0 trial.” (TL, p.26, Ls.5-9.)

After the court ruled

to ask

in this case

impossible for Mr. Patterson t0 d0

his best job to represent his client in this case,” the court advised

let

a recipe for

[was] at issue”; Hughes’ co-defendant, “Mr.

and he [had] speedy

Having not heard “anything

trial, it’s

(T12, p.26,

who Hughes
L.13

—

it

was unreasonable

characterized as a “great attorney,” to ﬁle a motion to

p.27, L.5.)

The court explained

t0

Hughes

that there

were

“very few circumstances by Which [the court could] consider a motion to dismiss,” that
the state

believe

was

had an

is

sure,

ethical obligation “to only

g0 forward with a case

a true case,” and that Mr. Patterson

was “looking

at

that they in

good

was “a very good lawyer” Who,

faith

the court

every avenue he [could],” Within the bounds of law, “to try to

get whatever evidence [was] exculpatory 0f [Hughes] into evidence.”

(TL, p.27, L.6

—

p.28, L.21.)

Hughes thanked the court

that his “Fourth

done.”

Amendment

(Tr., p.28,

for the explanation

rights [had]

and again expressed

been violated” and

that

his belief

“something should be

L.22 — p.29, L.4.) Referring to Mr. Patterson, Hughes explained:
This gentleman, he put in a motion t0 Withdraw, so

I felt

like

he could

stand up t0 the Court and ask for the Court t0 hear the motion and the Court can

say yes or n0.

I

just don’t it’s [sic] unreasonable.

are at a situation to Where he does not trust me. We are at a
where would it even be good to go to trial, because he’s very
disappointed in What I did I mean, Ihad to try t0 be heard the best I could. I don’t

And now we

situation to

feel like it’s unreasonable.

(TL, p.29, Ls.4-14.)

Again attempting

to allay

Hughes’ concerns, the court noted

that

Mr. Patterson had

“diligently looked into” suppression issues related t0 the search warrant, including

“sitdown” With the prosecutor and the magistrate judge.

Hughes

it

try t0 get

“fully trust[ed]

and expect[ed]

[Hughes] acquitted

at trial.”

Hughes had “made some complaints
“[I]n defense

that

him

(Tr., p.30,

t0 the bar.”

to sabotage

Ls.19-22.)

Witnesses, eight 0f

later,

and Jephson both elected
defense.

(TL, p.617, L.21

—

— p.31,

(E

I

t0 harbor

—

Hughes exclaimed

to

L.4.)

The

state

presented 11

generally Tr., pp.5-7.)

p.623, L.6.)

in front

ill

have a good amount of

and both rested without calling any witnesses

p.621, L.18, p.622, L.24

prosecutor’s initial closing argument,

like that.

(R., p.1 18.)

trial.

Mr. Patterson cross—examined.
to not testify,

told

The court concluded,

I’m certain he’s not going

your case or anything

the case proceeded to

Whom

The court

This was so despite the fact that

(TL, p.30, Ls.22-24.)

respect for the job that he can d0 for you.” (TL, p.30, L.24

Eight days

getting a

Mr. Patterson [would] d0 everything he [could]

0f you he will do the best he can, and

feelings that will cause

(TL, p.30, Ls.2-6.)

by

At

Hughes
in their

the conclusion of the

of the jury, “Your Honor,

my

attorney has not represented

The court

Ls.1 1-13.)

me proper[l]y,

effectively

and he’s doing

little

while

later,

— p.698,

In response t0 the court’s inquiry,

“multiple questions” that

L.

Hughes complained

Hughes wanted him

t0 ask,

again advised Hughes that “the strategy 0f counsel

with the client” and explained,

“We

are at a point

that

(Tr.,

p.700, L.20

—

(TL, p.701, L.7

is

ﬁrmly

left t0

Where the evidence

arguments” and

it

The court noted

p.702, Ls.2-8.)

Patterson.” (TL, p.702, Ls.9-15.)

(TL, p.702, Ls.16-19, p.703, L.9

At

the conclusion of the

[his]

counsel, With consultation

is

closed, so

—

— p.704,
trial,

any concerns

that ship [h]as

the “only thing left to be done [was] closing

own

Hughes chose

The court

p.702, L.1.)

gave Hughes the choice of “continu[ing] with Mr. Patterson as

closing argument” 0r of “present[ing]

p.701,

Mr. Patterson had not asked

about what Mr. Patterson has done 0r not done with respect t0 the evidence,

(T12,

—

had not presented any Witnesses, and had

not sufﬁciently cross—examined the state’s witnesses.

sailed ....”

1 .)

the court interrupted Mr. Patterson’s closing argument and called a

recess to address Hughes’ “outburst” outside the presence of the jury.

L6.)

0n purpose.” (TL, p.697,

instructed the jury to “ignore and not consider” Hughes’ statement, and Mr.

Patterson thereafter began his closing argument. (T12, p.697, L.14

A

it

[his]

counsel in

closing argument and terminat[ing]

to continue With

L.1, p.704, L.25

the jury found

Mr.

Mr. Patterson’s representation.

— p.712, L9.)

Hughes

guilty as charged of conspiracy to

trafﬁc in heroin, trafﬁcking in heroin (three counts), possession 0f methamphetamine With intent

t0 distribute,

and possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.217-20.)

The jury acquitted Hughes

0f possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute but found him guilty of the included
offense ofpossession 0f marijuana. (R., pp.219-20.)

On December

12,

2017, Mr. Patterson ﬁled a renewed motion for leave to Withdraw as

Hughes’ attorney 0f record.

(R., pp.222-27.)

Following a hearing, the

district court

granted the

motion and,

at

Hughes’ request, appointed the public defender.

court thereafter entered judgment

(R.,

pp.230-31, 241-42.)

The

0n the jury’s verdict and imposed an aggregate uniﬁed sentence

0f 22 years, with 12 years determinate.
judgment.

(R.,

pp.283-85, 300-05.)

(R., pp.276-81.)

Hughes timely appealed from the

ISSUE
Hughes

states the issue

Did

0n appeal

as:

the district court Violate Mr. Hughes’ right [t0] effective assistance of

conﬂict-[free] counsel as protected

Constitution

by

the Sixth

Amendment

to the

United States

denying counsel’s motion t0 Withdraw and compelling counsel t0

by
Hughes under an

represent Mr.

active conﬂict 0f interest?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Hughes

failed t0 establish either that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by

denying retained counsel’s motion to withdraw 0r that the denial of that motion violated Hughes’
Sixth

Amendment

right to the effective assistance

nor retained counsel ever alleged,

Hughes never exercised

much

his right to

of conﬂict-free counsel Where neither Hughes

any conﬂict 0f interest, and Where
ﬁre counsel and retain or seek appointment 0f a different
less established,

attorney?
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ARGUMENT
Hughes Has Failed To Show The
Effective,

A.

Or Violated His Right T0
Conﬂict-Free Counsel BV Denying Retained Counsel’s Pretrial Motion To Withdraw
District

Court Abused

Its

Discretion

Introduction

Hughes argues

the district court erred

by denying Mr. Patterson’s

motion

pretrial

t0

withdraw, claiming that by so doing the court “compelled defense counsel to represent Mr.

Hughes

own

while laboring against a conﬂict 0f interest with his

at trial

“violated Mr. Hughes’ right t0 effective and conﬂict-free counsel as guaranteed

Amendment.” (Appellant’s
the applicable law

Hughes’ argument

brief, p.24.)

shows the

district court

Patterson’s pretrial motion t0 Withdraw.

effective

fails.

acted well within

and thereby

client”

by

the Sixth

A review of the record and 0f
its

discretion in denying Mr.

Although Hughes had a Sixth Amendment right

t0

and conﬂict—free representation, neither Mr. Patterson nor Hughes alleged 0r claimed

any actual conﬂict 0f interest

that prevented

Mr. Patterson from representing Hughes. Moreover,

because Hughes had the absolute right to ﬁre Mr. Patterson and then either hire a

new

attorney or

seek the appointment 0f substitute counsel, the court had n0 duty t0 inquire Whether there was

good cause

to substitute counsel.

by the motion

B.

t0

Standard

Withdraw, he has failed t0 show a Sixth

were not implicated

Amendment Violation.

to grant

an attorney’s motion to Withdraw

State V. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90,

good cause.” (emphasis added»;

c_f.

is

reviewed for an abuse

856 P.2d 872, 880 (1993).

44.1(a) (“Leave to Withdraw as the attorney of record for a defendant

for

rights

Of Review

The decision whether
0f discretion.

Because Hughes’ Sixth Amendment

may be

E

alﬂ

I.C.R.

granted by the court

State V. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512, 523

(2007) (decision whether t0 appoint substitute counsel reviewed for abuse of discretion).
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In

evaluating Whether a lower court abused

inquiry,

which asks “whether the

(2) acted Within the outer

its

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four—part

trial court: (1)

boundaries of

its

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;

discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal

standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261,

My Fun Life,

it;

and

_,

(4)

reached

its

decision

429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

the

by

(citing

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

“Constitutional issues are pure questions of law over Which [the appellate court] exercises

free review.” State V. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 418,

C.

Hughes Has Established Neither

348 P.3d

1,

32 (2015).

An Abuse Of Discretion Nor A

Violation

Of His

Sixth

Amendment Rights
Idaho Criminal Rule 44.1 sets forth the circumstances in which an attorney
as the attorney of record for a defendant in a criminal case.

Relevant t0

may withdraw

this case, the rule

provides:

(a)

Leave

t0

Withdraw. N0

attorney

may Withdraw

as an attorney 0f record for

any defendant in any criminal action without ﬁrst obtaining leave and order of
the court on notice t0 the prosecuting attorney and the defendant except as

Leave

Withdraw as the attorney 0f record for a
defendant may be granted by the court for good cause.

provided in

I.C.R. 44.1(a).

this rule.

t0

Although Idaho’s appellate courts do not appear

the context of an attorney’s motion to withdraw, the Idaho

“good cause” justifying a defendant’s request
0f

interest; a

Which leads

t0

have deﬁned “good cause” in

Supreme Court has explained

that

for substitute counsel “includes an actual conﬂict

complete, irrevocable breakdown 0f communication; 0r an irreconcilable conﬂict

t0

an apparently unjust verdict.” Lippert, 145 Idaho

(citations omitted).

In determining whether

timing 0f the motion. Lippert, 145 Idaho

at

good cause

at

596-97, 181 P.3d at 522-23

exists, a trial court

should consider the

597, 181 P.3d at 523. Ultimately, “[t]he onus
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is

on

the attorney seeking withdrawal to present sufﬁcient facts t0 support his motion.” State V. Grant,

154 Idaho 281, 285, 297 P.3d 244, 248 (2013) (citing Frazier
(Tex. App. 2000)).

to

withdraw] only

The
if

it

appellate court “Will reverse the

trial

V. State, 15

S.W.3d 263, 265-66

court’s decision [to

violates the defendant’s right t0 counsel.”

Li

deny a motion

(citing State V. Severson,

147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009)).
In this case, Mr. Patterson essentially offered three bases for his pretrial

motion

t0

Withdraw: (1) Hughes was not accepting Mr. Patterson’s legal advice and was insisting that Mr.
Patterson ﬁle motions Mr. Patterson

State Bar, thereby “put[ting]

client,”

and

(3)

the motion, at

frivolous, (2)

Hughes had

sent a letter to the Idaho

[M12 Patterson] in a potentially adversarial position With [his]

an unspeciﬁed “ethical concern ha[d] arisen” that made Mr. Patterson “unable t0

Hughes adequately

represent Mr.

deemed

at trial.”

(R., pp.105-07.)

which Mr. Patterson explained

more

in

insistence that he ﬁle a frivolous motion, the fact that

The

district court

held a hearing on

detail his frustrations regarding

Hughes had

Hughes”

sent a letter t0 the State

Bar

complaining about Mr. Patterson’s performance, and the fact that Hughes had “some unrealistic
assumptions” about his defense that did not “bear out legally.” (TL, p.22, L.4 — p.24, L.5.) After
hearing from Mr. Patterson, the district court denied the motion, ﬁnding Hughes’ disagreement

with Mr. Patterson’s strategic decisions was not a valid basis for withdrawal.
p.25, L.1

The court

1.)

t0 permit

Mr. Patterson

withdraw on
defendant.

and

that

also found the fact

that basis

t0

Hughes was

p.25, Ls.12-14.)

Withdraw, especially since in

would have

(TL, p.25, L.14

Hughes had written a

—

“free t0 hire

this case

the effect 0f delaying the

p.26, L.4.)

The court noted

and ﬁre him as

[he]

But having not heard “anything
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letter t0 the

that

trial

ma[de]

—

Bar was not a reason

allowing Mr. Patterson t0

for both

Hughes and

his co-

Mr. Patterson was private counsel

saw ﬁt and bring

that

(TL, p.22, L.7

it

in another counsel.” (TL,

impossible for Mr. Patterson to

d0

his best job t0 represent”

so “close to

trial.”

Hughes, the court was unwilling t0 allow Mr. Patterson to Withdraw

(TL, p.26, Ls.5-9.)

Hughes challenges

the district court’s ruling

0n a number 0f bases,

all

of Which are

premised 0n his assertion that Mr. Patterson was “laboring under an actual conﬂict of interest”
such that the denial 0f Mr. Patterson’s motion t0 withdraw violated Hughes’ Sixth
right t0 the effective assistance

He

capitalization omitted).)

0f conﬂict-free counsel. (Appellant’s

brief,

Amendment

pp.9-23 (bolding and

claims in one breath that the court failed t0 conduct an adequate

inquiry into the alleged conﬂict of interest, but argues in the next breath that the court

“aggravate[d] the [alleged] Sixth
the bases for his motion

also argues that

Amendment

0n the record and

Mr. Patterson’s “conduct

was operating under an

active conﬂict

Violation”

in the presence

at the

by permitting Mr. Patterson
0f the prosecutor.

(Id.,

t0 explain

pp.1 1-16.)

He

hearing 0n his motion to withdraw establishes he

between his own

interests

and those 0f his

client,”

and

that

the alleged conﬂict adversely affected Mr. Patterson’s performance and “impacted his ability to

act as a zealous advocate at trial.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21.)

merit and

show n0

Violation of his Sixth

The Sixth Amendment

Amendment rights.

right t0 counsel

encompasses two

adequate representation and a right t0 choose one’s

retained.

United States

V.

Hughes’ arguments are without

own

counsel

distinct rights:

when counsel

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); United States

m,

618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th

“right to

be represented by conﬂict-free counsel.” Severson, 147 Idaho

(citing

Wood

V.

Cir. 2010).

The

a right t0

is

V.

privately

Rivera-

right to adequate representation includes the

at

703, 215 P.3d at 423

Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)). This right applies t0

all

defendants and

“focuses 0n the adversarial process, not 0n the accused’s relationship With his lawyer as such.”

United States

V.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21 (1984).
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To

protect this right, “a trial court has

knows

an afﬁrmative duty to inquire into a potential conﬂict Whenever

it

know that

marks omitted)

a particular conﬂict

may exist.”

Li. (internal quotations

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); Cuvler

or reasonably should

V. Sullivan,

(citing State V.

446 U.S. 335, 357

(1980)).

A
from the

who

defendant

can hire his

right t0 effective

Rivera—Corona, 618 F.3d

original);

ﬂ alﬂ

afford to

pay

by

his

own

counsel—the
at

979

right “t0

(citing

at 146)).

instances in

own

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S.

attorney, the right t0 counsel

Although the

which a

attorney of choice

be represented by an attorney of his choice.”

State V. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 393 P.3d 585 (2017)

the counsel he believes to be the best.

U.S.

attorney has an additional right, separate and distinct

is

trial

’97

may

interfere

0f choice

is

With that

that the accused

be defended

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548

not unlimited, there are only a few

right, including

Wheat

laboring under a conﬂict 0f interest.

147-48) (emphasis in

(“[W]hen the defendant can

(ellipses in original, quoting

right to counsel

court

‘commands

at

V.

When

the defendant’s

United States, 486 U.S. 153,

159-60 (1988).
In this case,

Hughes exercised

represent him. Although

his right t0 choice

0f counsel by retaining Mr. Patterson t0

Hughes occasionally complained before

trial that

Mr. Patterson was not

ﬁling motions Hughes believed should be ﬁled, he never expressed any intention t0 ﬁre Mr.
Patterson and hire a different attorney, nor did he ever ask the court for the appointment of a

substitute attorney at county expense.

L.2; Tr., p.26, L.13

Hughes

at the

—

p.31, L.7.)

(E R., pp.96-99;

11/20/18 Tr., p.9, L.14

—

p.10, L.11,

This was so despite the fact that the court speciﬁcally advised

hearing on Mr. Patterson’s motion t0 Withdraw that Hughes was “free to hire and

ﬁre” Mr. Patterson as Hughes “s[aW] ﬁt.” (TL, p.25, Ls.12-14.) Because Hughes chose to retain

Mr. Patterson as his attorney, there was no basis for inquiry into whether counsel should be
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substituted—nor did counsel’s motion t0 Withdraw trigger a duty to inquire—because that choice

belonged exclusively to Hughes.

The court did have

E

D_aly, 161

Idaho

at

930, 393 P.3d at 590.

discretion t0 grant Mr. Patterson’s

motion

t0 Withdraw.

But

its

decision to deny the motion did not Violate Hughes’ right t0 conﬂict-free counsel because,

contrary t0

Hughes

assertions

actual conﬂict 0f interest that

trial.

on appeal, neither Mr. Patterson nor Hughes ever alleged any

would have prevented Mr. Patterson from representing Hughes

Mr. Patterson represented in his motion and again

at the

at

hearing thereon that Hughes was

not accepting Mr. Patterson’s legal advice and was insisting that Mr. Patterson ﬁle motions Mr.

Patterson

deemed

relationship with

letter to the

13.)

frivolous.

(R.,

pp.103-08;

Hughes had become

Tr., p.22, Ls.9-25.)

He

also represented that his

potentially adverse due to the fact that

Hughes had

Idaho State Bar complaining about Mr. Patterson’s performance.

Finally,

sent a

(Tr., p.23, Ls.1-

he represented that Hughes had “some unrealistic assumptions” about his defense

that did not “bear out legally.”

(TL, p.22, L.13

—

p.24, L.5.)

None 0f these grounds

alleged any

conﬂict 0f interest that rose to constitutional signiﬁcance.

T0 demonstrate an

Amendment,

actual conﬂict under the Sixth

(1) that his counsel actively represented conﬂicting interests;

adverse effect.

(1978);

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 (1980);

Chippewa

V. State,

Holloway

V.

and

a defendant must show:

(2) that the conﬂict

had an

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-84

156 Idaho 915, 921, 332 P.3d 827, 833 (2014); State

V.

Wood, 132

Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998); compare I.R.P.C. 1.7(a) (“concurrent conﬂict of interest
exists if

is

the representation 0f one client will be directly adverse to another client; 0r

a signiﬁcant risk that the representation of one 0r

the personal interests of the lawyer”).

Mr. Patterson’s motion

t0

Although

more

it is

clients Will

clear

there

be materially limited by

from the record of the proceedings 0n

withdraw that he and Hughes disagreed about which claims were
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appropriate and could be ethically made, such

his client, not

an actual conﬂict of

interest as

was a personal disagreement between counsel and
deﬁned by case law. By refusing

to take actions

requested by his client because they were not, in counsel’s judgment, ethical 0r legally sound,

Mr. Patterson was not even allegedly “actively representﬁng] conﬂicting

Nor

did the fact that

Hughes had

sent a letter t0 the

Patterson’s performance create a conﬂict 0f interest Within the

interests.”

Bar complaining about Mr.

meaning of the Sixth Amendment,

and neither Hughes nor Mr. Patterson ever claimed as much. Hughes did express concern
Mr. Patterson “d[id] not

(T12,

him due

effectively represent

appointed.

fact that

would

[Hughes]” and was “very disappointed in what [Hughes] did.”

But Hughes never suggested

p.29, Ls.4-14.)

indicated he

trust

like to

to

that

any actual conﬂict 0f

ﬁre Mr. Patterson and hire a

Mr. Patterson would be unable

interest and, tellingly,

new

sent a letter t0 the Bar.

Hughes never

interest arising

While Mr. Patterson was

client.”

(R., p.106;

possibility of

some

him

any actually existing conﬂict of

constitutionally signiﬁcant conﬂict of interest, the denial 0f the

much

less Violate,

Hughes’ arguments
failed t0 conduct

was

Mr. Patterson thus alleged only a mere
interest that

required the district court t0 grant his motion t0 Withdraw. Because there

implicate,

letter

in only “a potentially adversarial position with [his]

TL, p.23, Ls.1-13, p.24, Ls.2-5.)
future conﬂict, not

from the

clearly frustrated with

Hughes’ “frequent and public complaints,” Mr. Patterson also acknowledged that the
“not ofﬁcially a bar complaint” and put

t0

attorney 0r have substitute counsel

Mr. Patterson likewise never alleged an actual conﬂict of

Hughes had

that

Hughes’ Sixth Amendment

was n0

motion

to

would have

allegation 0f a

withdraw did not

rights.

t0 the contrary are Without merit.

He complains

that the district court

an adequate inquiry to determine Whether a conﬂict of interest actually existed.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12, 14-16.)

This argument
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fails

because the duty of inquiry

is

only

triggered

which

is

“When

the

trial

court

knows

not to be confused with

0f a conﬂict.”

0r reasonably should

when

the

trial

court

is

know

that a particular conﬂict exists,

aware of a vague, unspeciﬁed possibility

Hall V. State, 155 Idaho 610, 619, 315 P.3d 798, 807 (2013).

For the reasons

already set forth above, Mr. Patterson’s motion—alleging disagreements regarding legal strategy,

a “potentially adverse” relationship due to Hughes’ communication with the Bar, and an

unspeciﬁed “ethical concern”—did not communicate to the court that Mr. Patterson was in any

way

actively representing competing interests and, thus, did not give the trial court any reason t0

know of the

existence 0f any particular conﬂict 0f interest.

(R., pp.105-07.)

At

alleged a “vague, unspeciﬁed possibility of a conﬂict,” inquiry into Which

Hall, 155 Idaho at 619,

Even assuming
t0 inquire

315 P.3d

at

trial

of the law t0 the record shows the

interest existed, application

Supreme Court has

In addressing

What

court’s examination of the potential conﬂict

256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003)]; Smith
(8th Cir.

1991).

constitutes an adequate

stated:

must be thorough and

searching and should be conducted 0n the record. See [State

1320

required.

807.

court conducted an adequate inquiry in this case.

[A]

was not

motion

the allegations in Mr. Patterson’s motion triggered the district court’s duty

Whether a conﬂict of

inquiry, the Idaho

best, the

The court “must make

v.

v.

Lopez, 139 Idaho

Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,

the kind 0f inquiry that might ease

the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, 0r concern.”

Smith, 923 F.2d at 1320.
However, in determining Whether a conﬂict exists, trial courts are entitled t0 rely
0n representations made by counsel. Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897
(9th Cir. 1967).
A court may inquire further into the facts, but “is under no
original or continuing obligation to d0 so.” Id.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424.

As
which

it

detailed above, the court in this case held a hearing

on Mr. Patterson’s motion

allowed Mr. Patterson to explain fully the reasons he was seeking t0 Withdraw.

at

Mr.

Patterson had every opportunity at the hearing t0 address any potential conﬂict 0f interest, but he

18

voiced n0 concerns in that regard and instead indicated, as he had in his motion, that his desire to

withdraw rested on the
dissatisfaction With

—

fact that

Hughes was a

difﬁcult client and

Mr. Patterson’s representation, including in a

had repeatedly expressed

letter to the Bar.

L5.) After hearing from Mr. Patterson, the court reasonably concluded

p.24,

nothing that “ma[de]
this case.”

it

that there

L.9

was

impossible for Mr. Patterson t0 d0 his best job t0 represent his client in

And

(Tr., p.26, Ls.5-8.)

TL, pp.24-3 1 .)

(T12, p.22,

his

In fact,

neither Mr. Patterson nor

When given

Hughes

He

(E generally

Hughes characterized Mr.

the opportunity to speak}

Patterson as a “great attorney.” (TL, p.26, Ls.13-24.)

disagreed.

did express concern that Mr. Patterson

had not ﬁled certain motions he believed should have been ﬁled, and he was afraid Mr. Patterson

was “disappointed”
to

in him.

(TL, p.26, L.13

— p.30,

L.1.)

But Hughes never suggested he Wished

ﬁre Mr. Patterson and never alleged that Mr. Patterson was actively representing any interests

that

competed with

court’s inquiry

and

that

his

own.

(E generally

was more than adequate

Hughes was not deprived 0f the

Hughes argues

Tr.,

pp.24-31.) Based 0n this record,

t0 discover that there was, in fact,

it is

clear the

no conﬂict of interest

effective assistance of conﬂict—free counsel.

the court’s inquiry

was not adequate because

the court “did not expressly

determine whether Mr. Hughes’ ‘frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic View’ created
a conﬂict of interest for counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, p.15.) According to Hughes, the court

was

1

The court did not afﬁrmatively inquire 0f Hughes at the hearing on the motion to withdraw,
presumably because it was Mr. Patterson’s motion and Hughes had not indicated any intention to
ﬁre Mr. Patterson and hire another attorney or seek the appointment of substitute counsel.

Compare

M,

154 Idaho

at

285-86, 297 P.3d at 248-49

(trial

court did not err

by not

questioning defendant extensively at hearing on appointed counsel’s motion to Withdraw based

0n alleged deterioration 0f attorney—client relationship Where defendant did not join in motion
161 Idaho at 929-30, 393 P.3d at
and “took no initiative to request substitute counsel”);

w,

589-90 (inquiring 0f defendant regarding reasons defendant Wishes t0 terminate retained counsel

would violated defendant’s
opportunity to speak

right t0 counsel

when he

requested

it.

0f choice). The court
(Tr., p.26,
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L.13 — p.3 1,

did,

however, give Hughes the

L.7.)

required to accept Mr. Patterson’s representation that he could “n0 longer give effective legal

counsel” based on Hughes’ “frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic View of how the
case can be resolved” as a representation that Mr. Patterson’s ability to represent

impaired by a conﬂict of
Sixth

gg,

Amendment

that

(Id.)

sense, exists only

QM, 446 U.S.

fact that

interest.

at

when

“frequent[ly]

Those

facts,

E,

the district court, the

strategy,

and even

and public[1y] complain[ed]” about his dissatisfaction with counsel’s

may have

having t0 continue t0 represent a difﬁcult

client.

however, did not even give

put Mr. Patterson in the difﬁcult position of

(TL, p.24, L.15

rise to

interests in receiving a fair trial.

— p.26,

L.9;

ﬂ

Tr., p. 24, Ls. 2-

an inference that Mr. Patterson was actively

representing competing interests 0r that Mr. Patterson’s

Hughes’

As found by

Mr. Patterson and Hughes had conﬂicting viewpoints regarding legal

Hughes

interest, in the

there are separate interests that actually conﬂict.

350; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 481-82.

unwillingness t0 ﬁle certain motions,

5.)

But as already explained, a conﬂict of

Hughes was

own

interests in

any way conﬂicted with

Because neither Mr. Patterson nor Hughes raised the

specter 0f any constitutionally signiﬁcant conﬂict of interest, the district court did not err

by not

inquiring further before denying Mr. Patterson’s motion.

In direct contradiction of his claim that the district court failed t0 conduct an adequate

inquiry to determine whether a conﬂict of interest actually existed,

“aggravat[ed] a Sixth

for his

Amendment Violation” by allowing Mr.

motion 0n the record and

in the presence

Hughes next argues

the court

Patterson to ﬁllly explain the bases

of the prosecutor. (Appellant’s

Speciﬁcally, he argues the court violated his right to counsel

brief, pp.12-14.)

by allowing Mr. Patterson

to

“divulge conﬁdential information” and t0 “disparage his client” in the prosecutor’s presence “in
order t0 justify his request t0 Withdraw.”

(Id.)

He

also argues that,

by divulging information he

claims was conﬁdential, Mr. Patterson breached his ethical duties 0f loyalty and conﬁdentiality,
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thereby creating an “active conﬂict 0f interest” necessitating that the

withdraw.

(Id.,

trial

court permit

him

t0

pp. 12-14, 16-20.) Neither of Hughes’ arguments withstand analysis.

The United

States

Supreme Court has observed

determine Whether a conﬂict 0f interest exists, a

trial

that,

in conducting

an inquiry t0

court should not “improperly require[e]

disclosure of the conﬁdential communications of the client,” noting that “[s]uch compelled

disclosure creates signiﬁcant risks of unfair prejudice” t0 the client.

and

n.1

E

1.

31$

Holloway, 435 U.S.

at

487

I.R.P.C. 1.6 (“lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation 0f

a client” absent informed consent or authorization by rule),

1.8(b) (“lawyer shall not use

information relating t0 representation of a client t0 the disadvantage 0f the client” absent

informed consent or authorization by

Contrary t0 Hughes’ assertions, the Holloway

rule).

Court’s admonishment has no application in this case, ﬁrst, because the district court in no

compelled Mr. Patterson

t0 divulge

any conﬁdential information in order

t0 justify his

Withdraw and, second, because the information Mr. Patterson did divulge was not

in

way

motion

to

any sense

conﬁdential.

At

the outset of the hearing

0n Mr. Patterson’s motion

to Withdraw, the court simply

addressed Mr. Patterson and gave him free reign to explain the bases for his motion. (TL, p.22,
Ls.4-8.)

The court did not

interrupt

private counsel and that Hughes’

complaint.

(TL, p.22, L.9

information,

much

—

less require

Mr. Patterson, except to

clarify that

communication with the Bar was a

letter,

Mr. Patterson was
not a disciplinary

p.24, L.14.)

Because the court did not seek any conﬁdential

Mr. Patterson

t0 provide

it,

Hughes’ claim of trial court error

is

necessarily Without merit.

Moreover, Hughes’ claims that the
ethical duties

trial

court erred and that Mr. Patterson breached his

of conﬁdentiality and loyalty by divulging conﬁdential and disparaging information
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about his client

fail

because none of the information Mr. Patterson disclosed to justify his request

be characterized either as “conﬁdential” or as “disparaging” or

for withdrawal can fairly

disadvantageous t0 Hughes” defense.

Mr. Patterson represented that Hughes was insisting Mr.

Patterson ﬁle a motion to dismiss based 0n

dummied up by”

the magistrate.

(Tr.,

Hughes

C6

3

theory that the search warrant was

p.22, Ls.16-25.)

This information was far from

conﬁdential because (1) Hughes himself had previously advised the court that he wanted counsel
t0 ﬁle

motions t0 suppress and to dismiss and that he desired t0 personally inspect the search

warrant to “make sure that
Patterson represented that he

it

[was] authentic and not forged” (R., pp.96-97), and (2) Mr.

and

the prosecutor

had met With the magistrate

t0 explore the

issues related to the validity 0f the search warrant (TL, p.22, Ls.16-25).

For obvious reasons, Mr. Patterson’s representation that Hughes had written a
State

letter to the

Bar complaining about Mr. Patterson’s performance was likewise not conﬁdential

information, and

Finally,

Hughes makes no claim

t0 the contrary.

Mr. Patterson’s representation that Hughes had “some unrealistic assumptions”

about his defense—particularly, that Hughes’ co-defendant, Mr. Jephson, was “going t0 get on
the stand and exonerate him,” a proposition Mr. Patterson did not think

conversations with Mr. Jephson’s attorney and

t0 the court

and prosecutor.

Hughes had repeatedly
(R., pp.96-97;

and

after the

(TL, p.23, Ls.13-21.)

not ever say this

13,

man had

—

p.10, L.11.)

2017, hearing

at

it

not information otherwise

Hughes made these

it[.]”

moved

unknown

to Withdraw,

had “been confessed plenty 0f times.”
assertions both before

which Mr. Jephson volunteered

anything t0 do With

based on his

realistic

Before Mr. Patterson

asserted his innocence, claiming

11/20/18 Tr., p.9, L.14

November

mother—was

was

in

(TL, p.21, Ls.14-15.)

open

court, “I did

Mr. Patterson’s

disclosure to the court and the prosecutor that he believed, based on conversations with others,
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that

Mr. Jephson would likely not

Jephson

’s

trial strategy,

and Hughes.

Nor

did

but

it

it

was not information

may have conveyed
that

information about Mr.

was conﬁdential between Mr. Patterson

reveal any adverse information about Hughes’ “likely defense (or

absence thereof)” (Appellant’s

privy;

testify at trial

Mr. Jephson’s decision

brief, p.20) t0

Which the court and prosecutor were not already

t0 testify or not

was

entirely his

own, and Hughes himself had

previously lamented, in the context of professing his innocence, that Mr. Jephson could not be

compelled

to testify at trial (1 1/20/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.17-25).

Hughes

a

cites

number 0f cases

who

an attorney

for the proposition that

discloses

m
M

conﬁdential information breaches his ethical duties of conﬁdentiality and loyalty and “create[s]

an obvious conﬂict 0f interest” With his

client.

m,

V.

Libby

923 P.2d 560 (Mont. 1996); People
V.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.18-19 (citing

Ragusa, 220 P.3d 1002 (Colo. App. 2009);

Hubbard, 408 P.3d 532 (Mont. 2018)). The cases Hughes

as explained above,

representation of

Mr. Patterson did not disclose any conﬁdential information related

Hughes and,

comparison of the

facts

Hughes’ assertion

that

establishes that he

cites are inapposite because,

of

as such, did not breach

m,

any of his

Mr. Patterson’s “conduct

was operating under an

at the

active conﬂict

Moreover, a

ethical duties.

ﬁgu—sa, and Hubbard t0 the facts of

to his

this case actually refutes

hearing on his motion to Withdraw

between his own

interests

and those of

his client.” (Appellant’s brief, p.20.)

In

m,

for example, Jones’ attorney attempted t0 justify his

detailing for the court

by

and prosecution “why he believed Jones was so clearly

disclosing Jones’ “conﬁdential admission of guilt.”

circumstances, the

motion

Montana Supreme Court found

m,

923 P.2d

that the attorney

at

had

to

Withdraw by

guilty,” including

566-67. Under those

“totally

abandoned

his

adversarial role” and “essentially join[ed] the prosecution’s efforts in obtaining a conviction,”
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thereby “creat[ing] an obvious conﬂict of interest and abandon[ing] his duty 0f loyalty to Jones.”

Li. at

567 (brackets added,
Similarly, in

internal quotations

m,

and prosecution during an

in

and

citation omitted).

the defendant’s privately retained attorneys disclosed to the court

camera proceeding

Which the defendant was not present

at

their

privileged discussions with the defendant regarding the state’s plea offers and their opinions that

the defendant’s decision t0 not accept the plea deal

poor” choice. qu_sa, 220 P.3d
statements defendant

made

t0

at

was “ﬂat out wrong” and was “a

1005. During a second in camera hearing they also “repeated

them about the

they were presenting” and

‘patsy defense’

“expressed their concern that they were ‘being set up’ and
1005, 1007.

very, very

made

a ‘target’

by defendant.”

Li. at

Focusing on the fact that counsel disclosed the privileged communications during

hearings where the defendant was, at counsel’s behest, intentionally not present, the Colorado

Court of Appeals concluded that the attorneys” conduct showed “that they and defendant were in
conﬂict in ways that g0 beyond differences 0f opinion as t0 matters 0f
strength of defendant’s case

or animosity between

created an actual conﬂict of interest.

Li. at

1007

them

....,”

trial

strategy 0r the

none of which would have

(ellipses added, citations omitted).

“[d]efendant’s attorneys ‘actively represented conﬂicting interests’

Instead,

by making a record which

could be used in their favor and against defendant in some unspeciﬁed proceeding that they
anticipated

would

Finally, in

had sent

t0

later occur.” Li. (citing

Hubbard,

trial

QM, 446 U.S.

at 350).

counsel attached to his motion t0 Withdraw an “email Hubbard

him explaining why she believed she was entrapped”

t0

commit

the crime with

which

she had been charged. Hubbard, 408 P.3d at 535. Counsel also described Hubbard’s defense as
“frivolous” and explained in detail

Why

he believed that was

conceded and the Montana Supreme Court found that
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trial

so.

Li.

On

appeal, the state

counsel’s actions violated his duties of

loyalty

and conﬁdentiality. Li

such gave

rise to

at

536-37. The court declined t0 address Hubbard’s assertion that

an “actual conﬂict 0f

developed actual conﬂict argument.”

interest,”

Li. at

536

however, because Hubbard did “not present a

The court

n.4.

also found

Hubbard was not

prejudiced by counsel’s unprofessional errors because substitute counsel represented her at

trial.

Li. at 537-38.

Unlike the attorneys in

m,

ﬁgu—sa, and Hubbard, the record in

this case

shows Mr.

Patterson engaged in no conduct that breached his duties 0f loyalty and conﬁdentiality or

otherwise created an actual conﬂict of interest that necessitated his removal as Hughes’ attorney.

The information Mr. Patterson shared

at the

hearing 0n his motion t0 Withdraw was neither

conﬁdential nor damaging t0 Hughes’ defense. Mr. Patterson did not suggest Hughes was guilty,
did not in any

way join

in the prosecution’s effort to convict him, did not share

information, and did not even intimate a division of loyalties between his

of his

client.

At worst, Mr. Patterson’s disclosures indicated

opinions about matters 0f trial strategy.

gg, ﬁgu—sa, 220 P.3d

at

Such did not

create

that

interests

and those

he and Hughes had conﬂicting

any actual conﬂict of interest.

1007 (observing “differences of opinion as

the strength 0f defendant’s case

own

any privileged

t0 matters

E,

0f trial strategy or

0r animosity between” counsel and the defendant d0 not

constitute actual conﬂicts of interest (ellipses added, citations omitted).)

In a ﬁnal argument,

deny Mr. Patterson’s motion

would have

Hughes contends
to

the district court erred

that,

its

decision t0

Withdraw in part on the court’s concerns that granting the motion

the effect 0f delaying Hughes’ and Jephson’s

Hughes argues

by basing

trial.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.21-23.)

because the court did not ﬁnd any abusive or dilatory intent in either

“counsel’s request t0 Withdraw” or “Hughes’ complaints,” and because “almost two months

remained in the statutory speedy

trial

period and the
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trial

had not been previously continued,” the

“court’s decision to

deny counsel’s motion

t0

Withdraw based 0n concerns ofjudicial efﬁciency

and potential abuse was arbitrary and violated Mr. Hughes’
Hughes’ argument

is

P.3d

trial,

was required
at

good cause existed

t0 allow

0f the motion.

to consider the timing

pp.22-23.)

Mr. Patterson

E, 1g”

to

m,

withdraw, the
145 Idaho

at

district

597, 181

522-23. Because allowing counsel to Withdraw would have required a continuance 0f the

the court

had discretion

t0

deny the motion unless doing so would have resulted

Violation of Hughes’ right to counsel.

378

(Id.,

Without merit.

In deciding Whether

court

right to counsel.”

(Ct.

E

App. 2015) (“Although the

continuance, such discretion

is

abused

State V. Rockstahl, 159 Idaho 364, 369,

trial

in a

360 P.3d 373,

court judge has discretion t0 grant or deny a

denying a continuance results in abridgement of

if

[a

defendant’s] right to counsel.” (brackets in original, internal quotations and citations omitted»;

M,

154 Idaho

at

285, 297 P.3d at 248

withdraw will be reversed “only
For

all

(trial

if it violates the

court’s decision to

deny counsel’s motion

t0

defendant’s right t0 counsel”).

0f the reasons already discussed, the denial 0f Mr. Patterson’s motion to withdraw

did not even implicate Hughes’ Sixth

Amendment

Hughes nor Mr. Patterson ever alleged

right to conﬂict-free counsel because neither

the existence of any actual conﬂict of interest.

anything, granting Mr. Patterson’s motion to withdraw and continuing the

trial,

If

when Hughes

never joined in the motion or indicated a Wish t0 ﬁre Mr. Patterson and hire a different attorney,

would have infringed 0n Hughes’ Sixth Amendment
choice.

own

w,

right to

proceed to

trial

With counsel 0f his

161 Idaho at 928, 393 P.3d at 588 (“[W]hen the defendant can afford to pay his

attorney, the right t0 counsel

‘commands

that the

accused be defended by the counsel he

believes t0 be the best.” (ellipses in original, quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146)).

court’s decision t0 not interfere with that right
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and

t0 not jeopardize

The

Hughes’ and Jephson’s

speedy

trial rights

was not “an unreasoning and

arbitrary insistence

upon expeditiousness

in the

face 0f a justiﬁable request for delay” and therefore did not Violate Hughes’ right to counsel.

Morris

V. Slapgy,

The

461 U.S.

1,

11-12 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).

district court clearly

as discretionary

perceived

and acted well within

standards in deciding the motion.

Amendment right to

much

decision Whether to grant Mr. Patterson’s motion

discretion and consistently with the applicable legal

its

The

its

denial 0f the motion did not Violate Hughes’ Sixth

conﬂict-free counsel because neither Mr. Patterson nor

less demonstrated,

an actual conﬂict of

ability t0 effectively represent

Hughes

interest that

If

at trial.

Hughes ever

would have impaired Mr.

alleged,

Patterson’s

Hughes believed Mr. Patterson could not

otherwise effectively represent him, he retained the absolute right t0 ﬁre Mr. Patterson and either
hire a

new

Having

attorney 0r request the appointment of substitute counsel.

failed t0

do

so,

and

having failed to show from the record that Mr. Patterson was laboring under any constitutionally
signiﬁcant conﬂict of interest, Hughes has failed t0
Violation 0f his Sixth

show

either

an abuse 0f discretion or a

Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the judgment.

DATED this 3 lst day of May, 2019.

Kenneth Jorgensen

/s/

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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